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PRESS COMMENT UPON TRIALS
By HON. STANLEY H. JOHNSON, Judge of the Juvenile Court
URING recent years the American press have indulged
increasingly in comments upon issues which have
fallen within the jurisdiction of the courts for trial. In
so doing, in many instances, they have seriously impeded the
administration of justice. The English courts have never
tolerated such action, but in America, either through igno-
rance, fear, inertia or too great an adherence to the constitu-
tional principle of liberty of speech, our judges have been
overindulgent. The deplorable conditions of the Hauptmann
trial are an example of how this laxity disgraces important
trials with the aspect of a Gilbert and Sullivan comic opera.
A most interesting article was published upon this sub-
ject and the trial in the May number of the American Bar
Association Journal. It was also discussed by a member of
our own bar in Denver. That there is no privilege of the
press to comment upon facts or persons connected with an
issue at trial, or about to be tried, is well established in Amer-
ica as well as in England and should be well known. This is
especially true in Colorado in view of the decisions of the
Supreme Courts of Colorado and the United States in the
Patterson case. But there are also decisions in many other
states, some of which may be found in 13 Corpus Juris 34,
clearly stating that any comment or conduct of such a nature
as may tend to impede the proper administration of justice is
contempt of the court which has jurisdiction of the matter.
It would seem that no necessity exists for discussing this
well known rule. But a situation which arose recently in the
Juvenile Court disclosed an ignorance of the law. And the
history of criminal cases in Colorado and the comments
thereon of the Denver press indicate that there is a striking
need for education and reform by our courts.
In September an issue of dependency was tried in the
Juvenile Court before a jury concerning the custody of the
children of parents who had many times been the subject of
unfavorable comment in the press. The petition had been
filed upon July 8, 1935, and when a jury trial was demanded
the court issued an order detaining the children pending the
trial. During these proceedings, articles commenting rather
freely upon the history of the family appeared in the press.
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They might have been the cause of an action of contempt
against publishers and reporters.
Because of these and former articles of like nature, the
attorney for the father moved for change of venue on the
ground that the entire city, the judge and the officers of the
court were prejudiced. The motions were denied. Two jur-
ors from the panel, however, were successfully challenged for
cause, and several others admitted having read articles but
denied prejudice.
During the first day of the trial, representatives of the
press were present. It was certain the case would last several
days and cost the city at least $300. In order to save expense
the jury must be released at adjournments. The court there-
fore warned the reporters that no editorial comments or any-
thing but factual statements would be permitted. The order
was strictly complied with after the warning, but the reporters
for both papers came into chambers and expressed astonish-
ment at the ruling, inquiring upon what legal authority the
order was founded. Both stated they knew of no such statute
in Colorado.
In People vs. News-Times Publishing Co., 35 Colo.
254, the publisher, Patterson, was punished for criminal con-
tempt for the publication of disparaging comment upon the
decision of the Supreme Court justices in a case still pending
upon a petition for rehearing. Upon pages 360 to 381 of the
long opinion there is a discussion of authorities. The court
quotes with approval from its decision in the case of Cooper
vs. People, 13 Colo. 337, wherein the judge's character had
been attacked in a publication in connection with a case pend-
ing, the following language:
"Parties have a constitutional right to have their causes tried fairly
in court by an impartial tribunal uninfluenced by newspaper dictation
or popular clamor. What would become of this right if the press may
use language in reference to a pending cause calculated to intimidate or
unduly influence and control judicial action? Days, and sometimes
weeks, are spent in endeavoring to secure an impartial jury for the trial
of a case; and when selected, it is encumbent upon the court to exercise
the utmost care in excluding evidence of matters foreign to the issues
involved, so that the minds of the jurors may not perchance be unduly
biased or prejudiced in reference either to litigants or to the matters
upon trial; but if an editor, a litigant, or those in sympathy with him,
should be permitted through the medium of the press by promises,
threats, invectives, sarcasm, or denunciation to influence the result of
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the trial, all the care taken in the selection of the jury, as well as the
precaution used to confine their attention at the trial solely to the issues
involved, will have been expended in vain."
In the Patterson case, at pages 392 to 394, it was also
decided that truth is no defense to the charge of contempt.
Publications of such a nature may amount to contempt at any
time after issuance of a warrant in a criminal case, or of a writ
or the filing of a complaint or petition in a civil cause:
State vs. Howell, 80 Conn. 668, 69 Atl. 1057;
Globe News Co. vs. Com., 188 Mass. 449, 74 N. E. 682;
Rex vs. Parke, 2 K. B. 432.
But not after a cause is ended.
Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454;
Cooper vs. People, 13 Colo. 373;
But see Burdett vs. Com., 103 Va. 838, 846, 48 S. E. 878.
In Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, at 462, Mr.
Justice Holmes expressed the following opinion:
"A publication likely to reach the eyes of a jury, declar-
ing a witness in a pending cause a perjurer, would be none the
less a contempt that it was true. It would tend to obstruct
the administration of justice, because even a correct conclusion
is not to be reached or helped in that way, if our system of
trials is to be maintained. The theory of our system is that
conclusions to be reached in a case will be induced only by evi-
dence and argument in open court, and not by any outside
influence, whether of private talk or public print. When a
case is finished, courts are subject to the same criticism as other
people; but the propriety and necessity of preventing interfer-
ence with the course of justice by premature statement, argu-
ment or intimdation hardly can be denied."
The purpose of this article is not to analyze and exhaust
the law upon the subject; it is too clear to require more than
these brief examples. But to the writer it has appeared that
the freedom exercised by the press without restraint by our
courts endangers the fairness of our trials, exposes the public
to expense from potential mistrials and tends to bring our
places of justice into contempt. There is no reason to sup-
pose that, with proper warning and education from the
courts, the press will not cooperate in doing away with this
mischief. No one would wish to see the liberty of the press
curtailed except in instances where it impairs a more impor-
tant right.
COAL MINING A PUBLIC UTILITY-A DIFFERENT
VIEW
By PAGE M. BRERETON, of the Denver Bar
T HE writer has read with interest the article "Coal Min-
ing a Public Utility," presented in October DICTA.
The disorganization of the industry described is real and
a remedy is, no doubt, sorely needed. The writer, however,
doubts the practicability of the remedy suggested. In the first
place it is submitted that the language quoted from Chapter
46 of the Compiled Laws of 1921:
"* * * and every corporation, or person now or hereafter
declared by law to be affected with a public interest, and each thereof,
is hereby declared to be a public utility and to be subject to the jurisdic-
tion, control and regulation of the Commission and to the provisions of
this Act."
contemplates not a judicial but a legislative declaration that
the business is affected with a public interest, which at present
is lacking.
Even if the legislature should pass an act declaring the
business of coal mining to be affected with a public interest or
by such an act attempt to place the business directly under the
jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, the constitutionality
of such an act might well be doubted in view of Dorchy vs.
Kansas, 264 U. S. 286, 68 L. Ed. 686, decided subsequent to
"People vs. United Mine Workers" and in which it is held
that the business of coal mining is not affected with a public
interest and that any attempted regulation analogous to that
proposed is violative of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution and therefore void. See also Charles
Wolff Packing Company vs. Court of Industrial Relations,
262 U. S. 522, 67 L. Ed. 1103.
"People vs. United Mine Workers of America" was cited
in the Dorchy case but its reasoning evidently was not ap-
proved. Indeed, while the case has not been overruled ex-
pressly, some doubt is cast upon the soundness of the decision
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as a judicial precedent in People vs. Aladdin Theater, 96 Colo.
527, 530.
Indeed, it is to be questioned whether the gains that the
industry is alleged to have made under the code were not more
illusory than real if the entire industry be considered. The
principal activity of the "Code Authority," at least in the
northern Colorado coal field, revolved around an attempt to
enforce a regulation adopted by that authority providing that
all mines in the area charge a "differential," to-wit, an in-
creased price on all coal that moved from the mines by truck
or wagon over that charged for coal that moved from the
mines by rail. This differential was first fixed at 75c per ton;
more than the railroad freight from any mine in the district to
Denver. My recollection is that it was afterward reduced to
50c per ton.
This regulation, unique in the history of merchandising,
so far as the writer knows, while it was enforced bore heavily
upon the mines which had no railroad facilities or which had
theretofore catered to the trucking trade, and may have stifled
a few small enterprises. Tonnage was diverted from such to
the larger minijg units which had railroad facilities, thus giv-
ing them a temporary prosperity. Those benefited have been
vocal in praise of the regulation. Those injured have not
been able to make themselves heard over the Hallelujah
chorus. Whether the industry as a whole has benefited is
questionable.
It is suggested that if the coal mining industry were
under jurisdiction of the Utilities Commission, that body
could prevent the opening of new mines by refusing "Certifi-
cates of Public Convenience or Necessity." Undoubtedly the
opening of new mines when there are sufficient mines now in
operation to supply the demand is a disorganizing element in
the industry. On the other hand, for the state to tax the own-
ers of undeveloped coal lands on their coal values, as is the
practice, and at the same time forbid the owner to sell or use
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the coal (in many cases the only value which the land has)
would be a gross injustice and amount to confiscation.
Again, it is hardly consonant with justice to say to A,
"You are forbidden to mine your land so that your neighbor
B can mine his coal at a profit."
A man is ordinarily entitled to use his land for any use
to which it may be adapted so long as he does not create a
nuisance and on this point the words of Chief Justice Hughes
in a case involving attempts to enforce the "proration" law of
the State of Texas are at least significant:
"The existence and nature of the complainants' rights are not
open to question. Their ownership of the oil properties is undisputed.
Their right to the enjoyment and use of these properties subject to
reasonable regulations by the state in the exercise of its power to pre-
vent unnecessary loss, destruction and waste, is protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Sterling vs. Coanstantin,
287 U. S. 378, 77 L. Ed. 375.
To the writer it does not seem possible either to make
existing coal mines subject to regulation as public utilities, or
to shut off the opening of new mines without invading rights
of the owners guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.
The Guffey bill has now been enacted into law. Its
constitutionality may well be doubted. Its purpose is clearly
regulations by the Federal Government of intrastate business
and the writer doubts whether this can be effected by changing
the emphasis from the "interstate commerce clause" to the
"taxing power."
If the Guffey act is to accomplish its purpose, one thing
is immediately apparent. The members of the industry must
treat each other fairly. What disgusted the public with the
codes was the tendency (early exhibited) for an organized
majority of each industry to "racketeer" under the aegis of
"Code Authority" at the expense of less influential members
of the industry.
If that tendency is carried over into the "Little NRA"
initiated under the Guffey act, not only will there be no sta-
bilization but the condition created will be worse that the un-
restricted competition that now exists.
AMENDMENT TO INTERNAL REVENUE ACT AS AN
AID TO CHATTEL MORTGAGEES
By Louis A. HELLERSTEIN, of the Denver Bar
U PON the repeal of the prohibition act it was felt by
finance companies and particularly those dealing in
automobile mortgages that the Federal Government
would cease its activities in the way of seizing automobiles,
upon which they held mortgages for the carrying, illegally, of
liquor. This hopeful feeling was short-lived since an exami-
nation of the Internal Revenue Act in force prior to August
27, 1935, was such as to make his burden even heavier. Un-
der the prohibition act, a holder of a chattel mortgage upon
an automobile, seized while carrying what is commonly
termed "bootleg liquor" could, under the prohibition act, in
the event he was an innocent holder of the mortgage and had
carefully investigated the applicant who mortgaged the car,
file his claim under the mortgage and thereupon, after the pro-
duction of evidence to substantiate his claim, have the auto-
mobile returned to him, if the amount of his debt exceeded the
appraised value of the car, or if in the event the car was ap-
praised at a greater value than his debt, have his claim allowed
and upon sale of the automobile he paid his indebtedness. An
examination of the Internal Revenue Act (prior to August
27, 1935) disclosed that if the evidence showed the automo-
bile was seized with illicit liquor therein, the same was sub-
ject to forfeiture to the United States, regardless of the fact
that the mortgagee was innocent in the transaction and had no
knowledge concerning its usage or that it would be so used.
Numerous authorities have so held and their citation at this
time would be of little value in view of the new amendment
hereinafter referred to and now in effect. There were some
exceptions to forfeiture such as in the case of a stolen car and
other similar examples.
At the last session of Congress, at the request of inter-
ested parties, there was introduced before that body and passed
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both by the Senate and the House, a new amendment to the
Internal Revenue Act, which was duly approved thereafter by
the President of the United States on August 27, 1935. This
new amendment appears in the United States Code Compact
Edition, special pamphlet, No. 9, as title 21, under "Intoxi-
cating Liquor," and Section 40 A thereof. This new amend-
ment is as follows:
Sec. 40a. REMISSION OR MITIGATION OF FORFEI-
TURE OF VEHICLE OR AIRCRAFT; POSSESSION PENDING
TRIAL.
(a) JURISDICTION OF COURT. Whenever, in any pro-
ceeding in court for the forfeiture, under the internal-revenue laws, of
any vehicle or aircraft seized for a violation of the internal-revenue laws
relating to liquors, such forfeiture is decreed, the court shall have exclu-
sive jurisdiction to remit or mitigate the forfeiture.
(b) CONDITIONS PRECEDENT TO REMISSION OR
MITIGATION. In any such proceeding the court shall not allow the
claim of any claimant for remission or mitigation unless and until he
proves (1) that he has an interest in such vehicle or aircraft, as owner
or otherwise, which he acquired in good faith, (2) that he had at no
time any knowledge or reason to believe that it was or would be used
in the violation of laws of the United States or of any State relating to
liquor, and (3) if it appears that the interest asserted by the claimant
arises out of or is in any way subject to any contract or agreement under
which any person having a record or reputation for violating laws of
the United States or of any State relating to liquor has a right with
respect to such vehicle or aircraft, that, before such claimant acquired
his interest, or such other person acquired his right under such contract
or agreement, whichever occurred later, the claimant, his officer or agent,
was informed in answer to his inquiry, at the headquarters of the sher-
iff, chief of police, principal Federal internal-revenue officer engaged in
the enforcement of the liquor laws, or other principal local or Federal
law-enforcement officer of the locality in which such other person ac-
quired his right under such contract or agreement, or the locality in
which such other person then resided, and of each locality in which the
claimant has made any other inquiry as to the character or financial
standing of such other person, that such other person had no such record
or reputation.
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(c) CLAIMANTS FIRST ENTITLED TO DELIVERY.
Upon the request of any claimant whose claim for remission or mitiga-
tion is allowed and whose interest is first in order of priority among such
claims allowed in such proceeding and is of an amount in excess of, or
equal to, the appraised value of such vehicle or aircraft, the court shall
order its return to him; and, upon the joint request of any two or more
claimants whose claims are allowed and whose interests are not subject
to any prior or intervening interests claimed and allowed in such pro-
ceedings, and are of a total amount in excess of, or equal to, the
appraised value of such vehicle or aircraft, the court shall order its return
to such of the joint requesting claimants as is designated in such request.
Such return shall be made only upon payment of all expenses incident
to the seizure and forfeiture incurred by the United States. In all other
cases the court shall order disposition of such vehicle or aircraft as pro-
vided in sections 304f to 304m of Title 40, and if such disposition be
by public sale, payment from the proceeds thereof, after satisfaction of
all such expenses, of any such claim in its order of priority among the
claims allowed in such prcceedings.
(d) DELIVERY ON BOND PENDING TRIAL. In any
proceeding in court for the forfeiture under the internal-revenue laws of
any vehicle or aircraft seized for a violation of the internal-revenue laws
relating to liquor, the court shall order delivery thereof to any claimant
who shall establish his right to the immediate possession thereof, and
shall execute, with one or more sureties approved by the court, and
deliver to the court, a bond to the United States for the payment of a
sum equal to the appraised value of such vehicle or aircraft. Such bond
shall be conditioned to return such vehicle or aircraft at the time of the
trial and to pay the difference between the appraised value of such vehicle
or aircraft as of the time it shall have been so released on bond and the
appraised value thereof as of the time of trial; and conditioned further
that, if the vehicle or aircraft be not returned at the time of trial, the
bond shall stand in lieu of, and be forfeited in the same manner as, such
vehicle or aircraft. Notwithstanding the provisions of this subsection
or any other provisions of law relating to the delivery of possession on
bond of vehicles or aircraft sought to be forfeited under the internal-
revenue laws, the court may, in its discretion and upon good cause
shown by the United States, refuse to order such delivery of possession.
(Aug. 27, 1935, c. 740, Sec. 204, 49 Stat-)
An examination of the foregoing discloses that the
holder of the mortgage, if he comes within the amendment,
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may obtain relief so that his mortgage debt is protected when
seized under the Internal Revenue Act. The amendment is
just and equitable as otherwise the holder of the mortgage
loses his property, practically without any recourse, since he
is deprived of his security and may not have the same sub-
jected to his debt. The new amendment also permits the
delivery of the car to a mortgagee upon bond which is of sub-
stantial assistance since it ordinarily takes approximately 90
days to have a claim heard and pending the hearing the auto-
mobile depreciates in value and storage is added to the cost of
the proceedings, which are chargeable against the claimant
before he may have the automobile returned upon allowance
of his claim.
Attorneys representing finance companies or those deal-
ing in mortgages particularly upon automobiles will find in
the amendment the means of protection of the interest of the
clients where the clients themselves use diligence in investigat-
ing the party mortgaging the automobile to them and find no
facts to indicate the automobile would be used illegally. The
former provisions of the Internal Revenue Act were harsh and
without justification. It may have originally suited the exist-
ing conditions, when the law was passed, but with advent of
automobiles, the law was extreme and unwarranted. The
new amendment indicates the progress in the making of laws
consistent with present conditions.
Mr. F. D. Stackhouse, clerk of the District Court, advises that
approximately fifty attorneys are interested in the decree in Case No.
91471, Water District No. 9; that the counties and the water board who
pay for the printing of the decree have agreed on a price of $5.00 for
extra copies and there will be approximately ninety copies available at
that price as soon as the decree is printed. Any attorney who desires a
copy may notify the clerk's office.
Mr. Stackhouse further advises that the law library has received the
latest book published by the American Law Institute, entitled "Restate-
ment of Trusts," in two volumes.
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE
For the past six months the American Law Institute
has prepared monthly short articles concerning the work and
accomplishments of the Institute. We publish below several
articles and will be glad to have our readers comment on the
value of the articles and their interest in publication of the same.
PROBLEMS OF RESTATEMENT
The Privilege of Political Discussion
Extended discussion was aroused at the recent Torts
conference of the American Law Institute over the privilege
of political discussion of public officers and candidates for
office. There is a distinct split of authority, both sides of
which are championed by reputable courts, as to whether the
principle of fair comment upon a matter of public interest
extends to and affords a protection against liability for
defamation for the false allegations of facts which besmirch
the character of such persons. The cases are in agreement
that, if the facts are truly stated, the expression of a disparag-
ing opinion, if it is an honest one, is conditionally privileged,
so long as it pertains to the public conduct of an officer or to
the qualifications of such a person or a candidate for such an
office. An illustration will show the application of the rule:
A published an article in a newspaper, criticizing the method
of construction of certain sewers in X, declaring that there
were many indications of incompetence in the performance of
the work. B, the public official in charge of the construction,
sues A for libel. A's remarks are privileged if they represent
his honest judgment. If this condition exists, the fact that
the sewers were well and competently constructed, does not
defeat the immunity.
The desirability of such protection in a democracy is
obvious. Public servants are accountable to the public. Even
the most conscientious and scrupulously honest public officer
must expect criticism. Moreover, he must expect his public
life to be appraised by persons whose judgment does not con-
13
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form to sound critical standards. Therefore, he knows or
should know that he will be misunderstood and subjected to
disparagement which is undeserved. Those who contend for
political preferment cannot be thin-skinned. The most that
can be expected is that opinion not be misrepresented, that is,
that it be a sincere expression of the critic's actual view.
Many courts, however, distinguish sharply between the
expression of opinion upon facts truly stated and the misrep-
resentation of facts, however honestly made, the former being
privileged, the latter not. This view was upheld by Judge
Taft in the Circuit Court of Appeals on the grounds that
"the danger that honorable and worthy men may be driven
from politics and public life by allowing too great latitude in
attacks upon their characters outweighs any benefit that might
occasionally accrue to the public from charges of corruption
that are true in fact, but are incapable of legal proof." On
the other hand, the opposite view is championed by the Su-
preme Court of Kansas and has been followed in a number of
western states. A recent Kansas case, Majors vs. Seaton, 46
P. 34 (1935), reiterates the view of the court expressed in
Coleman vs. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 (1908).
Observers insist that there is no discernible difference be-
tween the class of persons who in those states engage in public
life and those who receive the protection of the stricter rule.
The preliminary draft of the Restatement, now in preparation
for submission to the Council, sets forth the Kansas rule al-
though the members of the Torts group are divided in their
views in the matter.
LAW INSTITUTE RESTATEMENT MAKING
RAPID PROGRESS
Whether or not the bite of a watchdog off duty is privi-
leged to the same degree as the bite of a watchdog on duty
was one of the questiops which enlivened the deliberations of
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the midwinter meeting of the Council of the American Law
Institute held in the Bar Association Building, New York
City, the last of January and the first two days of February.
The question arose over a section in the preliminary draft of
the chapter on Absolute Liability of the Restatement of
Torts. As presented by the Reporter and his advisers, the
section concerning watchdogs stated that a possessor of land
or chattels is privileged to protect his property by keeping
therein a watchdog under the same conditions as those which
fix his privilege to use a mechanical protective device. A com-
ment to this rule asserted that if the circumstances are such as
to give the possessor of land the privilege to employ a watch-
dog as protector, the dog, even during the time when it is not
busy at its work on the premises, if kept with the care which
its dangerous nature requires, is not kept at the risk of abso-
lute liability, such as attaches to the possession of abnormally
dangerous domestic animals. The phrase, "an abnormally
dangerous domestic animal" means an animal whose be-
havior is not common to its class, such as a Great Dane -in
the habit of leaping in play on children or a horse playfully
putting its forefeet on people's shoulders. It does not in-
clude stallions, bulls or other stud animals. Ferocity, in other
than a watchdog, would stamp the dog as abnormally dan-
gerous. The guiding consideration in fixing the privilege is
the social purpose served by the animal.
Shall the owner of livestock be compelled to fence them
in, or the owner of premises upon which they may roam be
compelled to fence them out, was another question debated.
The draft of the Reporter, Prof. Francis H. Bohlen of the
University of Pennsylvania Law School, stated the English
common law rule to the effect that a possessor of livestock
which stray upon the land of another is liable for their intru-
sion and any consequent harm, although the possessor used
every care to prevent the straying. Although a Special Note
called attention to the fact that in many states the common
law rule had been rejected, some members of the Council felt
this should be more particularly emphasized.
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Work in progress, representing a greater advance in the
task of Restatement than has previously been achieved in any
similar period, was evidenced by new or revised drafts in
Trusts, Torts, Property, Quasi-Contracts, Sales of Land, and
the Administration of Criminal Law. A proposed final draft
in Trusts will be submitted to the annual meeting of the In-
stitute in May, and subject to such change as may be directed
by the membership and Council, the official draft will be
issued in the fall of 1935. A revision of the model statute on
Double Jeopardy was submitted to the Council and will also
be brought before the annual meeting in May. The basic
principle followed in the text of this draft is that an acquittal
or conviction-not jeopardy of conviction or punishment-
is a bar to a second prosecution for the same offense.
HOW THE COURTS USE THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE'S RESTATEMENT
A new and greatly enlarged edition of "The Restatement
in the Courts" has just been published by the American Law
Institute. It is sent to all purchasers of the Restatement of
Conflict of Laws. About three-fourths of the 354-page book
is given over to a series of concise citation paragraphs designed
to show just how the courts have used the several subjects of
the Restatement. Of the 819 citations given, the subject of
Contracts accounts for the largest fraction, with Conflict of
Laws and Agency in second and third place. While Con-
tracts would be expected to lead, having been available in
official form since 1932, it is interesting to note that Conflict
of Laws, existing only in tentative form until last February,
has been cited more frequently than Agency, of which the
official draft was issued in 1933. There are 369 Contracts
paragraphs, 141 Conflict of Laws, 133 Agency, 92 Torts, 53
Trusts, 7 Property.
The distribution of the citations by states shows that the
courts of every state, as well as the Federal and United States
Supreme Court, have referred to the Restatement. New
York, Pennsylvania, Kansas, Wisconsin, Mississippi and
Maryland, in the order named, furnished the greatest number
of paragraphs.
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In view of the fact that the subjects of Contracts and
Agency are the only parts of the Restatement which have been
available in definitive form until a few months past, this
widespread representation well attests the Restatement's influ-
ence. With the publication of the first two volumes of Torts
last fall, and the Restatement of Conflict of Laws last Febru-
ary, a considerable increase in citations seems likely, especially
by the courts which have felt reluctance to cite tentative
drafts.
The citation paragraphs have been prepared for the
practical use of the lawyer. In a compressed, headnote style
they give the pertinent factual circumstances and the holding
of the court, together with the sections of the Restatement
cited.
For the convenience of those who have used tentative
drafts of the subjects of Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts
and Torts, parallel tables of old and new section numbers,
making possible the ready conversion of tentative draft sec-
tions into official draft sections, are included in the book.
Another useful feature of the book, which may save a
good deal of page thumbing, consists of a glossary of words
and phrases used in the Restatement. The glossary covers
Agency, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, Property, Trusts and
Torts.
HOW NOT TO DO IT
Colonel Van Cise dug up the following clause in a will and sug-
gests that it ought to go down in history as an example of what not
to do:
"I hereby revoke any and all other wills, codicils or testamentary
dispositions heretofore at any time made by me insofar as the same may
be in conflict or inconsistent herewith."
UNLAWFUL PRACTICE OF LAW
A bill (S. 2944) was introduced in the Senate of the United States
May 13, 1935, to prevent and make unlawful the practice of law before
government departments, bureaus, commissions, and their agencies by
those other than duly licensed attorneys-at-law.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-COLORADO INDUSTRIAL RECOVERY ACT-
In re Interrogatories of the Governor Concerning Chapter 89,
Session Laws 1935-No. 13805-Decided October 28, 1935.
This opinion was in respect to the interrogatories of the Governor
concerning constitutionality of the Colorado Industrial Recovery Act
passed by the 1935 legislature.
1. Chapter 89, Session Laws 1935, generally known under the
name of Colorado Industrial Recovery Act, is unconstitutional.
2. Said Chapter 89 is a plain violation of Article III of the Con-
stitution of the State of Colorado which divides all governmental pow-
ers'into three departments and prevents the interference of one to
another.
3. Said act is unconstitutional because it is a violation of Article
IV of the state constitution which vests all legislative power in the gen-
eral assembly, save for certain exceptions.
4. The unconstitutionality of the act is settled by the decision
of Schechter vs. United States, 55 Supreme Court 837.-Mr. Justice
Bouck and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW - DISBARMENT - SUFFICIENCY OF GROUNDS
FOR-The People vs. Bentall-No. 13715-Decided October 28,
1935.
This was an original proceeding for disbarment of an attorney-
at-law based upon respondent's conviction of a felony.
1. Respondent, an attorney-at-law, having been convicted of a
felony, based upon plea of guilty to the commission of eight different
felonies, disbarment inevitable.-Judgment for disbarment entered.
BUILDING AND LOAN ASSOCIATIONS-STOCKHOLDER-LOAN TO
ASSOCIATION-DISTINCTION BETWEEN-The Silver State Build-
ing and Loan Association vs. Austin, et al.-No. 1355 1--Decided
October 28, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
This action was brought by Austin to recover a balance, alleged to
be due from defendant on a transaction claimed by the plaintiffs to be a
loan.
1. Judgment for the plaintiff on motion was properly granted.
2. Where a building and loan association borrows money and in
consideration thereof issued what it denominates a time certificate which
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provides that the same can be cashed at the end of six months for its face
value plus interest, this is an unambiguous contract and means exactly
what it says and the plaintiff is entitled to his money upon demand
after the expiration of the said time.
3. Even though in connection with such loan the building and
loan association and the loaner signs an application that he is purchasing
certain certificates of stock in the building and loan association, such
contract does not change or vary the terms of an absolute promise to
repay the money loaned.
4. The instrument evidencing the transaction controls and not
the means employed to secure the return of the money two years there-
after. This certificate of deposit clearly indicates an indebtedness which
was created and certain and definite arrangements for the repayment
thereof by the defendant.
5. An attempt by the defendant to construe the contract as a
contract to purchase stock and not a time certificate of deposit cannot be
upheld.
6. A time certificate does not become a stock certificate under the
pleadings.--Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Bouck dissents.
TAXATION-ELEEMOSYNARY CORPORATION-EXEMPTION-William
F. McGlone, Manager of Revenue and Ex-Officio Assessor and
Ex-Officio Treasurer of the City and County of Denver, Colorado,
vs. The First Baptist Church of Denver-No. 13523--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Young.
Action by a religious organization to have certain property re-
moved from the tax rolls and have the same declared exempt under the
Colorado Constitution and statutes.
The First Baptist Church purchased ground with improvements
thereon and paid taxes until the time the improvements were torn down
at which latter time the board of trustees contemplated erecting a new
church; for lack of finances the new buildings were not constructed and
the lots were vacant for several years.
Held: The trial court was right in finding as a matter of fact
that the vacanf property was exempt. The tearing down of the old
structure was the starting of the construction of a new building, which
in good faith is being carried out. The Colorado Constitution (Sec. 5,
Article X) provides: "Lots with the buildings thereon, if said build-
ings are used solely and exclusively for religious worship, for schools,
or for strictly charitable purposes . . . shall be exempt from taxa-
tion unless otherwise provided by general law." Section 7198, C. L.
'21 is almost identical.
The Colorado court has heretofore and now follows the liberal
construction and such property is exempt while the program of expan.
sion and construction is in good faith being carried out.
DICTA
CONTRACTS--PAROL EVIDENCE TO VARY WRITTEN INSTRUMENT-
RECITALS-CONSTRUCTION-Brennan vs. Monson, Public Trus-
tee et at.-No. 13753-Decided October 7, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Young.
This was an action to enjoin the foreclosure of real estate by the
public trustee. The plaintiff, Brennan, bought the property from the
makers of the trust deed and note. Subsequently an extension agreement
was made between him and the note holder. It contained the follow-
ing recital, "and, whereas, eighteen hundred and no/100 dollars of said
indebtedness remains unpaid, with interest paid to March 15, 1932."
Defendant relied on defaults in interest and payment of taxes sub-
sequent to that date. Evidence was offered but not admitted to prove
that payments prior to that date were sufficient to cover the alleged de-
faults and it was stipulated that payments subsequent to the said date
were insufficient.
1. This phrase is but a recital and does not constitute a contract
that interest was paid only to the date of extension.
2. The evidence offered would not have varied the terms of the
writing because to have that effect the recital would have to then be read"with interest paid only to March 15, 1932," and that was not the
contract of the parties.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-LIMITATIONS ON WRIT OF ERROR-
Hull vs. Denver Tramway Corporation et al.-No. 13816-De-
cided October 21, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
The claim being rejected by the Commission, an action was
brought in the District Court and on July 31, 1935, judgment was
rendered against the claimant. The writ of error issued September 13,
1935.
1. S. L. 1931, P. 825, Sec. 1 requires the clerk of the District
Court to return the record to the Commission within twenty-five days
unless in the meantime a writ of error addressed to the District Court
shall be obtained. This is a short statute of limitations and it is no
excuse that the judge was absent and could not sign the bill of excep-
tions within the said period. The writ of error is a writ of right and
the record may be filed subsequently.-The motion to dismiss the writ
of error is granted.
GARNISHMENT--AUTOMOBILE LIABILITY INSURANCE-Universal In-
demnity Insurance Company, Garnishee, vs. Richard E. Gore-No.
13517-Decided October 21, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Hil-;
hard.
Plaintiff, who sustained damages in an automobile accident, had
judgment against the Hertz Driv-Ur-Self System, Inc., which carried
liability insurance with the Universal Indemnity Insurance Company.
Plaintiff then caused garnishee summons to be served on the insurance
company and obtained judgment against the garnishee.-Affirmed.
DICTA
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-ICY SIDEWALKS-NEGLIGENCE-Evi-
DENCE OF-City and County of Denver vs. Brubaker-No.
13470-Decided October 21, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Bouck.
Plaintiff below slipped on an icy sidewalk and recovered a judg-
ment against the city. City alleges error on two grounds:. (1) the re-
fusal of the trial court to permit the introduction into evidence of a
certain ordinance relating to the cleaning of snow from sidewalks, and
(2) admission of evidence to the effect that other persons had fallen on
the same sidewalk.
1. The ordinance sought to be introduced interposes a duty on
property owners to keep their sidewalks clear of snow. The city does
not become responsible for such an accident until a reasonable time has
elapsed and the sidewalk has not been cleared by either the property
owner or the city. There was no showing that a reasonable time had
not elapsed. The ordinance was inadmissible.
2. Under ordinary circumstances, evidence of similar but dis-
connected incidents is inadmissible. The evidence here showed, how-
ever, that, within a period of forty-five minutes prior to the accident in
question, eight people had slipped or fallen. "The repeated slipping
within that time-too short to make a substantial change of condition
at all likely-had a direct bearing on the issue by indicating an unusual
situation which was dangerous." Such evidence tended to give con-
structive notice to the city in that it showed a continued existence of a
dangerous condition.--Judgment affirmed.
Justices Campbell, Burke and Holland dissent.
REPLEVIN - ADVERSE POSSESSION - SALE - DAMAGES - INTER-
EST-Belcoe vs. Heffelfinger-No. 13741-Decided October 14,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Personal property in the adverse possession of another may
be sold by the owner.
2. The purchaser steps into the shoes of the seller.
3. Evidence of damages showing value of property and length of
time it had been wrongfully detained was sufficient evidence to go to the
jury.
4. Interest was properly allowable.-Judgment affirmed.
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-ASSIGNMENT OF CLAIM-LIMITA-
TIONS-Lanke vs. American Medical and Dental Association-No.
13575-Decided October 21, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Campbell.
In an action for professional services the record held to show a
proper assignment to plaintiff and the claim held not barred by limita-
tion since sut was brought within the applicable period of limitation
after the last item of services on an open account.--Judgment affirmed.
DICTA
CONTRACTS-DIRECTORS OF SCHOOL DISTRICT--CONFLICTING EVI-
DENCE-Annie De Herrera vs. School District No. 11, Etc.-No.
13542-Decided October 21, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
Plaintiff, Herrera, applied to school board for position as teacher,
was offered $80 per month and asked for fifteen days' time to announce
her acceptance or rejection of offer. Later plaintiff discussed getting
higher salary with president of the board but higher amount suggested
by president was not satisfactory to plaintiff. Board then hired another
teacher, and then plaintiff came into court claiming that she had been
hired by the board at $80 per month. Trial court held that no contract
had been consummated.-Affirmed.
INSURANCE-DEATH FROM ACCIDENTAL MEANS-VIOLATION OF
LAW BY INSURED-PUBLIC POLICY-Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Company vs. Roma-No. 13462-Decided October 21,
1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Roma carried a life insurance policy which provided for double
indemnity in case of death "as the result directly and independently of
all other causes of bodily injuries sustained through external, violent and
accidental means" which were not "the result of violation of law by the
insured." Some person, unknown, entered Roma's house and shot and
killed him. His widow sued to collect the double indemnity. The
answer of the insurance company alleged that for years Roma had been
a violator of the narcotic laws and that he had been the leader of an
underworld gang so engaged, which vocation and leadership subjected
him to assassination, and that he was killed as a direct result of his voca-
tion and while engaged in the violation of law. A demurrer to this
answer was sustained by the trial court. The company elected to stand
on its answer.
1. The answer pleaded death by other than accidental means,
and it also pleaded death as the result of violation of law by the insured.
Therefore, the demurrer was erroneously sustained.
2. A contract to indemnify another for injuries resulting from
deliberate violation of the law, even though that purpose'is not expressed
in the contract, is against public policy and will not be enforced.-
Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions to overrule the
demurrer.
Mr. Justice Bouck concurs in the result.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler and Mr. Justice Hilliard dissent.
Mr. Chief Justice Butler, dissenting:
1. The facts pleaded in the answer fail to show a direct causa-
tive connection between the violation of law and the death and, there-
fore, fail to show that death resulted from other than accidental means,
as defined in the policy.
DICTA
EMINENT DOMAIN-FINAL JUDGMENT-ESTOPPEL-Heimbecher us.
City and County of Dener-No. 1355 4-Decided October 14,
1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. A previous mandamus action which was dismissed and not
appealed is not res judicata because it failed to state a cause of action and
the object sought and the parties defendant were different.
2. In eminent domain proceedings by a municipality the city
may dismiss the proceedings within ninety days after the decree, and
after ninety days the judgment becomes final and the city is bound to
pay the award.
3. The city joined issue in the Supreme Court on a case involv-
ing the amount of the damage (the appeal having been taken by Heim-
becher). The city contended the award was fair and so is now estopped
from claiming the award is excessive in the sense in which excessiveness
excuses a failure to complete the award by paying the price fixed.-
Judgment reversed.
EVIDENCE-CONFLICTING-EFFECT-CANCELLATION OF INSUR-
ANCE POLICY-Retail Hardware, Etc., Insurance Co. vs. Securi-
ties Corporation-No. 13519-Decided October 14, 1935-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
1. Where evidence of cancellation of fire insurance policy is con-
flicting judgment below finding that policy was not cancelled prior to a
loss by fire, will not be set aside.-Judgment affirmed.
WILLS-CONTEST-EVIDENCE-$ 1.00 BEQUEST-PROPONENT NOT
REPRESENT ESTATE-BURDEN OF PRooF-Lamborn v. Kirk-
patrick-No. 13512-Decided October 7, 1935--Opinion by
Mr. Justice Bouck.
1. It was proper to admit testimony showing that the proponent
of a will had engaged in extensive prior litigation and had acquired
some knowledge of legal phraseology, in order to prove that the phrase-
ology of the will in question was that of the proponent and not of the
testator.
2. In considering the question whether or not a witness is com-
petent to testify because named as a legatee in a will, a bequest of $1.00
is not to be considered as conferring a material benefit.
3. The proponent of a will is not a representative of the estate
but is merely an interested party.
4. Proponent of will, who lived in unlawful cohabitation with
the testator before and at the time the will was made, has the burden of
proving that such relationship was not used to influence the deceased in
making the alleged will.-Judgment affirmed.
Mr. Justice Holland and Mr. Justice Young dissent.
DICTA
IRRIGATION -DISTRICT BONDS-LIEN ON REAL ESTATE WITHIN THE
DISTRIcT-Lida Comstock, Executrix, vs. The Olney Springs
Drainage District-Decided October 7, 1935-Opinion by Mr.
Justice Campbell.
Board of Directors of plaintiff drainage district made findings of
increased value that would accrue to lands in the district if drainage
completed and, pursuant to statute, issued bonds for the purpose of
completing drainage. The defendant refused to pay the assessments on
her land, which was sold and treasurer's deed issued. The question was
whether or not the treasurer's deed to the real estate carried with it the
water rights. The court held that the treasurer's deed carried the water
rights with the property and denied the contention of the defendant that
shares of stock in a mutual irrigation company, not organized for per-
sonal profit, but held that such shares of stock are only incident to the
ownership of the water right.--Judgment affirmed.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-AMBIGUOUS INSTRUCTIONS FROM PRINCI-
PAL-R. T. Smith and The Larimer County Abstract Company
vs. Union Savings and Loan Association---No. 13717-Decided
October 7, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Verdict was directed by the lower court in favor of plaintiff in a
suit brought by it as principal against defendants as its agents, to recover
damages for violation of instructions in connection with the closing of
a real estate loan. The agents had construed the instructions as requir-
ing payment of special assessments by the borrower to date of closing,
while the principal contended that all deferred installments should have
been so paid.
The instructions were ambiguous and the interpretation of the
agents reasonable.-Judgment reversed with directions to enter judg-
ment for defendants.
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